ABSTRACT
Introduction
First, I would like to agree with Chafe on the importance for both linguists and psychologists of more deeply considering the relationship between mind, consciousness and language. I also think Chafe is right in claiming that this is most fruitfully accomplished by studying how mind and consciousness relate to real spoken language data where no parts have been edited out.
The risks involved in studying only invented data or data where 2 large parts have been edited out with reference to some doctrine of competence and performance are fairly obvious. The practice of declaring some occurring expressions in a transcription performance errors provides a very convenient way of excluding uncomfortable facts which do not fit with what oneÕs current theory predicts.
Conversely, the practice of constructing oneÕs theory totally on the basis of invented and selected examples often is a convenient way of providing support for the theory. The consequence of both of these practices in an overreliance on consensus concerning linguistic intuititions among groups of linguists. This, in turn, means that there is a danger that social group pressures rather than observable facts about linguistic usage become the strongest determinants of what is assumed to be the correct theory of language and communication.
There are, however, also a number of points in ChafeÕs paper which I think require further clarification.
Consciousness
Chafe provides no definition of consciousness (which admittedly is hard to do). Instead he characterizes consciousness by providing a number of properties of consciousness which bear a strong resemblance to qualities of consciousness earlier discussed in gestalt-psychology and phenomenology. However, even if there is no definition of consciousness, one may wonder whether the notion of consciousness implicitly provided by these properties is adequate or inadequate in the sense of being too narrow or too wide. Turning to Òneed for backgroundÓ, the fourth Òconstant propertyÓ mentioned by Chafe, this property seems to be primarily related to such phenomena as ÒidentificationÓ, ÒunderstandingÓ and ÒinterpretationÓ rather than to consciousness per se. In order to identify, understand or interpret something, one needs to have the relevant background information. But it also seems possible to be conscious of something which one can not identify, understand and interpret. If might even be possible to identify, understand or interpret something without being conscious of what one is doing.
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In fact, I think it can be claimed that an analysis of the relationship between consciousness and identification, understanding and interpretation is one of the most challenging tasks in trying to construct a theory of consciousness and that pursuing this task will involve an in-depth probe into the nature of the relation between consciousness and the need for background information.
If we continue by examining what Chafe calls ÒvariableÓ properties of consciousness , we see that, as with the "constant" properties, it is not obvious that these properties are all primarily properties of consciousness rather than of phenomena related to consciousness.
For example, with regard to Òoriginal sourceÓ, we may ask if it is the action per-se or the perception/experience of action which is the source of consciousness.
With regard to ÒfacticityÓ, we may ask if it is not the objects of consciousness, rather than consciousness itself, which are judged as factual or fictional, on the basis of the relationship between the objects of consciousness and reality. Concerning ÒinterestingnessÓ, it seems so intimately related to the "constant" property of ÒinterestÓ as to make õt questionable whether the two should really be thought of as separate properties. It does not seem possible that something could be interesting without there being someone who has an interest in it, which means that our theory should show the relation between Òhaving an interestin xÓ and Òx being interestingÓ.
Finally, with regard to ÒverbalityÓ, a property of the objects of consciousness, it is not clear why this property has been selected, given that there are other properties of the objects of consciousness like, for example, the sensory modality of a property which might be equally relevant.
On a more general level, one wonders if the properties discussed by
Chafe really identify the most significant dimensions of
consciousness. An alternative more phenomenologically inspired attempt might be the following. The point of departure would here be the idea of a mental act, characterized by intentionality, in the phenomenological sense (see, for example, (Husserl 1913) ); i.e., the act is characterized by being directed at some object or focus. This object may then be subclassified in different ways depending on the relations and properties that it has. For example, we might consider, the properties mentioned by Chafe, i.e., its source, whether it is immediate or displaced, whether it is actual or fictional or whether it is verbal or nonverbal. Secondly, the act of consciousness is also characterized by a certain ÒqualityÓ, i.e. there are one or more attitudes to the object that is focussed in the act, for example, attitudes of belief, hope, desire, fear or joy.
In this way, conscious mental acts may, at least to some extent, be contrasted both with regard to their object and their attitude. We may be conscious of the same object with fear or with joy and we may have an attitude of fear or of joy to several different objects. Sometimes what we say meets with surprising responses. One of the reasons for this is that we communicate content which we are not fully conscious of ourselves, such as aggression or love.
Another reason is that we also react to what others say in ways we are not fully conscious of. Communication can, thus, both with regard to sending and receiving take place on several levels of awareness.
It is here of a certain interest to link awareness with intentionality.
We have, in communication, not only levels of awareness but also what could be called levels of communicative intentionality.
As is the case with awareness, communicative intentionality probably constitutes a continuum from a low to a high degree of awareness and intentionality.
However, at least for communicative intentionality, it seems possible to discern three levels of special interest, namely, what in (Allwood 1976) is, by no means, necessary, It is not difficult to imagine how an act 13 of consciousness could cover both more or less than one intonation unit. Some form of argument is needed with regard to the separability or non-separability of thought and speech before we can accept that in studying units of intonation, we are studying consciousness.
Another problem is that not enough information concerning intonation units is provided in the article, They are claimed to be universal and a number of criteria enabling their recognition are given (temporal interruption, significant pauses, slight breaks in timing, acceleration-deceleration, change in pitch baseline, distinctive final pitch contour and final change in voice quality).
One difficulty with these criteria is that, as far as I can see, they are For some of the other difficulties with the notion of new information, see (Dahl 1976) .
Introspection, irrevocability and deixis
Over and above what has already been said, I would like to briefly discuss three points which are only tangentially related to ChafeÕs main argument. an even more future date). In both examples, the anchoring point of the present tense has been explicitly moved. However, granting that such examples exist, I think that Chafe probably is right in pointing out that moves of the deictic anchoring point are more uncommon with tense endings than with adverbs.
Conclusion
In spite of the points noted above, I would like to end by repeating that, in the main, I find Chafe«s approach very promising. One of the key areas to investigate if linguistics is to make progress, is precisely the interface between spoken language interaction, mind and consciousness and here Chafe is doing pioneering work.
